Probable Cause For Arrest
The Information on this site was provided by Daytona Beach DUI lawyer Kevin J. Pitts. Although a police officer making an investigatory stop must be able to articulate something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch, the level of suspicion required for such a stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause. State v. Marrero, App. 2 Dist., 890 So.2d 1278 (2005). A police officer may, in an appropriate circumstances, stop a person for the purpose of investigating possible criminal behavior, even though there is no probable cause for an arrest, as long as the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal activity. State v. Davis, App. 4 Dist., 849 So.2d 398 (2003). A founded suspicion upon which a police officer may initiate a stop of a person is something less than probable cause, but more than a mere suspicion; it is a reasonable suspicion that requires further investigation and is a suspicion which has some factual foundation in surrounding circumstances observed by officer, when those situations are interpreted in light of officer's knowledge. State v. Hunt, App. 5 Dist., 391 So.2d 760 (1980). A founded suspicion of criminal activity, such as will justify stopping suspect, does not have to rise to level of probability of guilt required for finding of probable cause, but it must be more than random selection, sheer guesswork or hunch. State v. W. O. R., App. 2 Dist., 382 So.2d 763 (1980), petition for review denied 388 So.2d 1120. For purposes of the stop and frisk law, circumstances can reasonably indicate that a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a violation of criminal laws or ordinances without necessarily indicating that high probability of guilt which is implied by the term probable cause. State v. Stevens, App. 4 Dist., 354 So.2d 1244 (1978). For purpose of determining whether officer who temporarily detains a suspect has “founded suspicion” rather than “mere suspicion,” “mere suspicion” has no objective justification and is no better than random selection, sheer guesswork or hunch. State v. Stevens, App., 354 So.2d 1244 (1978); Lachs v. State, App., 366 So.2d 1223 (1979).
A police officer's bare suspicion of criminal activity is insufficient to justify an investigatory, or Terry, stop. State v. Walker, App. 2 Dist., 991 So.2d 928 (2008), rehearing denied. A mere hunch that criminal activity may be occurring is insufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion to justify stopping an individual. Berry v. State, App. 1 Dist., 973 So.2d 1255 (2008). Arrest ? 63.5(4)Mere suspicion is not enough to support a stop. Newkirk v. State, App. 2 Dist., 964 So.2d 861 (2007). A police officer's founded suspicion for a valid investigatory stop cannot be based upon a mere hunch or guess. Williams v. State, App. 5 Dist., 910 So.2d 368 (2005). Purported inconsistencies in statements given to arresting officer by occupant of parked truck, together with fact that truck's occupant had reached under seat with his left hand as officer approached, fact that truck's turn signal lever was broken and hanging by wires, and truck's location outside abandoned house, did not give rise to reasonable suspicion justifying detention of occupant of truck; truck's occupant first told officer that a “friend” had just exited truck, then that a “guy” had just exited truck, officer never described motion under seat as furtive or suspicious, and broken turn signal lever alone established mere hunch, not reasonable suspicion. Simpson v. State, App. 2 Dist., 835 So.2d 394 (2003). Arrest ? 63.5(5)Pickup truck's broken turn signal lever, without more, did not afford officer observing broken lever sufficient reasonable suspicion to support detention of truck's occupant; although compromised ignition system might have provided requisite suspicion, dangling turn signal lever alone failed to establish more than mere hunch. Simpson v. State, App. 2 Dist., 835 So.2d 394 (2003). Arrest ? 63.5(5)Officer did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to justify detention of defendant, and thus defendant's arrest was unlawful and he could not be convicted of giving false name during arrest or lawful detention, where officer candidly acknowledged that he had only hunch that defendant and his companion were involved in drug transaction, that he was uncertain whether anything was actually exchanged between the men, he did not say that he had any extensive or specialized narcotics training, and he did not identify defendant or his companion as known drug dealers. Belsky v. State, App. 4 Dist., 831 So.2d 803 (2002).
Whether an officer has a founded suspicion for a stop depends on the totality of the circumstances, in light of the officer's knowledge and experience; a bare suspicion or mere hunch that criminal activity may be occurring is not sufficient. Belsky v. State, App. 4 Dist., 831 So.2d 803 (2002). Law enforcement officer may stop a vehicle and request identification from its occupants when the officer has founded or reasonable suspicion that the occupants of the vehicle have committed, are committing, or are about to commit a crime; a “mere” or “bare” suspicion will not suffice. Walker v. City of Pompano Beach, App. 4 Dist., 763 So.2d 1146 (2000). Founded suspicion, such as is required to stop criminal suspect, cannot be based upon mere hunch or guess. State v. Hopkins, App. 5 Dist., 661 So.2d 937 (1995). To make investigatory stop, officer's observations must reasonably indicate that defendant is committing, is about to commit, or has committed criminal violation; mere or bare suspicion is not sufficient. Mayhue v. State, App. 2 Dist., 659 So.2d 417 (1995), rehearing denied. Bare suspicion of illegal activity cannot support stop. Martin v. State, App. 2 Dist., 658 So.2d 1153 (1995). Behavior which may be suspicious but not demonstrably or conceivably criminal is not sufficient to establish founded suspicion for stop, even in high crime area. Hills v. State, App. 1 Dist., 629 So.2d 152 (1993), review denied 639 So.2d 981. To justify temporary detention under state law, officer must have founded suspicion of criminal activity; mere or bare suspicion is not sufficient. Nesmith v. State, App. 2 Dist., 616 So.2d 170 (1993). Bare suspicion is not sufficient to justify an investigatory stop. Bush v. State, App. 3 Dist., 594 So.2d 793 (1992). Reasonable or founded suspicion to support investigatory stop is more than mere suspicion, but less than probable cause. Brown v. State, App. 1 Dist., 592 So.2d 1237 (1992). Mere or bare suspicion of illegal activity cannot support temporary detention. Moore v. State, App. 4 Dist., 584 So.2d 1122 (1991). Police officers' “suspicion” that defendant may have stolen the radio he had been seen carrying was mere speculation and was not a founded reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed, was committing or was about to commit a criminal violation at the time they detained and searched him. Watson v. State, App. 1 Dist., 562 So.2d 415 (1990). Under this section, officer's “bare” or “gut” feeling that defendant was involved in criminal activity was insufficient basis for suspecting criminal activity, and did not justify pat-down search regardless of whether officer, subsequent to stopping defendant, formed reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and dangerous. Daniels v. State, App. 1 Dist., 543 So.2d 363 (1989). Showing that arresting police officer stopped defendant and companion in Miami warehouse area “curiously looking at the business in the area” was insufficient to give rise to anything more than bare suspicion of criminal activity, thereby rendering stop and subsequent search of defendant unreasonable; thus, firearm seized from defendant's person during such search was inadmissible in evidence as it constituted the fruit of an unreasonable search and seizure. Hudnell v. State, App. 3 Dist., 449 So.2d 930 (1984). Officer who observed defendant change direction of travel and change bag from one arm to another in high crime area and decided to approach defendant on a “hunch” did not have “founded” suspicion that defendant had committed, was committing, or was about to commit crime, so as to justify detention of defendant, and, hence, evidence and statements given to officer consequent to detention should have been suppressed. Wilson v. State, App. 2 Dist., 433 So.2d 1301 (1983). Fact that defendant, upon seeing squad car, quickly placed his hand in his jacket pocket and started walking faster did not give rise to founded suspicion upon which to stop defendant. R.B. v. State, App. 2 Dist., 429 So.2d 815 (1983). While probable cause is not required to justify a temporary detention, something more than mere suspicion is required. State v. Amerson, App. 4 Dist., 392 So.2d 311 (1980). For more information about the site go to reasonable suspicion.
Probable Cause For Arrest